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Abstract 
 
Fault tree analysis is commonly used to assess the reliability of potentially hazardous 
industrial systems. The type of logic is usually restricted to AND and OR gates which 
makes the fault tree structure coherent. In non-coherent structures not only 
FRPSRQHQWV¶IDLOXUHVEXWDOVRFRPSRQHQWV¶ZRUNLQJVWDWHVFRQWULEXWHWRWKHIDLOXUHRI
the system. The qualitative and quantitative analyses of such fault trees can present 
additional difficulties when compared to the coherent versions. It is shown that the 
Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) method can overcome some of the difficulties in the 
analysis of non-coherent fault trees. 
 
This paper presents the conversion process of non-coherent fault trees to BDDs. A 
fault tree is converted to a BDD that represents the system structure function 
(SFBDD). A SFBDD can then be used to quantify the system failure parameters but is 
not suitable for the qualitative analysis. Established methods, such as the meta-
products BDD method, the zero-suppressed BDD (ZBDD) method and the labelled 
BDD (L-BDD) method, require an additional BDD that contains all prime implicant 
sets. The process using some of the methods can be time consuming and not very 
efficient. In addition, in real time applications the conversion process is less important 
and the requirement is to provide an efficient analysis. Recent uses of the BDD 
method are for real time system prognosis. In such situations as events happen, or 
failures occur the prediction of mission success is updated and used in the decision 
making process. Both qualitative and quantitative assessment are required for the 
decision making. Under these conditions fast processing and small storage 
requirements are essential. Fast processing is a feature of the BDD method. It would 
be advantageous if a single BDD structure could be used for both the qualitative and 
quantitative analyses. Therefore, a new method, the ternary decision diagram (TDD) 
method, is presented in this paper, where a fault tree is converted to a TDD that 
allows both qualitative and quantitative analyses and no additional BDDs are 
required. The efficiency of the four methods is compared using an example fault tree 
library. 
 
1. Introduction 
Fault trees were first developed in the 1960s and are commonly used for the 
qualitative and quantitative analyses of causes of system failure. The analysis of 
complex industrial systems may produce thousands of combinations of events 
(minimal cutsets/prime implicants) which can cause system failure. The determination 
of these failure combinations can be a time-consuming process even on modern high 
speed digital computers. If the fault tree has many failure modes, the determination of 
the exact top event probability also requires lengthy calculations. For many complex 
fault trees this requirement may be beyond the capability of the available computers. 
Thus, approximation techniques have had to be introduced which resulted in loss of 
accuracy. 
A more convenient form for the logic function from the mathematical viewpoint is 
that of a Binary Decision Diagram [1]. It overcomes some disadvantages of 
conventional FTA techniques enabling efficient and exact qualitative and  quantitative 
analyses of both coherent and non-coherent fault trees. The BDD method is efficient 
for quantifying the system failure likelihood since it does not need the system failure 
modes as an intermediate step. It is also more accurate as there is no need for the 
approximations used in the traditional approach of kinetic tree theory [2]. The 
efficiency and the accuracy of the BDD method is discussed in [3,4]. 
 
Rather than analysing the fault tree directly the BDD method first converts the fault 
tree to a binary decision diagram, which represents the Boolean Equation for the top 
event. The resulting SFBDD can be used in the quantitative analysis, calculating the 
top event probability or frequency. 
 
An SFBDD does not provide all the information for the qualitative analysis, since not 
all the implicant sets of a non-coherent fault tree are necessarily prime and the list 
may not be complete. This means that it requires more than just a minimisation, as in 
the coherent case, to produce a full list of prime implicants. The full list can be 
obtained by applying the consensus theorem [5] to pairs of prime implicant sets 
involving a normal and negated literal. The first approach to this was presented by 
Courdet and Madre [6] and further developed by Dutuit and Rauzy [7] where a meta-
products BDD is formed. Every basic event is represented by two variables, Px and Sx, 
where the first of them represents the relevancy of the component (relevant or 
irrelevant) and the second variable represents the type of the relevancy (failure 
relevant or repair relevant). Since a meta-products BDD is in its minimal form, 
traversing its branches gives all the prime implicant sets.    
 
The second alternative method presented by Rauzy [9] uses the system SFBDD and 
converts it to the zero-suppressed BDD (ZBDD), presented by Minato [10]. The 
method requires to label nodes with failed and/or working states of basic events and to 
decompose prime implicant sets according to the presence of a given state of a basic 
event. The resulting ZBDD is in its minimal form and traversing its paths from the 
root vertex to terminal vertex 1 results in all prime implicant sets.  
 
The third alternative method investigated produces a labelled binary decision diagram 
(L-BDD), presented by Contini in [11] where every basic event is labelled according 
to its type. The additional information about the occurrence of every basic event is 
considered at an early stage of the algorithm, i.e. while converting a fault tree to an L-
BDD. An L-BDD has two branches, therefore, it does not provide all prime implicant 
sets. The L-BDD obtained from the fault tree is simplified and then the determination 
of prime implicant sets is performed where the rules of the calculation depend on the 
type of a basic event. The L-BDD resulting is minimised. 
 
The new alternative method for performing the qualitative analysis for non-coherent 
fault trees is presented in this paper where a fault tree is converted to a ternary 
decision diagram (TDD). The main concept of a TDD was presented by Sasao [8], 
which is expanded into an implementation methodology for fault tree analysis in this 
paper. A TDD has three branches leaving any variable: the 1 branch represents the 
failure relevance of the component, the 0 branch represents the repair relevance of the 
component (so far this is a conventional BDD presentation) and the consensus branch 
represents the irrelevance of the component. A TDD encodes all the prime implicant 
sets, since while calculating the consensus branch for every node the consensus 
WKHRUHPLVDSSOLHGDQGDOO³KLGGHQ´SULPHLPSOLFDQWVHWVDUHREWDLQHG+RZHYHUWKH
TDD can be non-minimal, therefore, the minimisation process needs to be performed 
removing the non-minimal paths from the 1 and 0 branches. Then the prime implicant 
sets can be obtained. Also, the obtained TDD can be used for the quantitative analysis 
as well as the qualitative analysis, therefore, no additional BDDs are required. 
 
The four methods are described in the following sections and demonstrated 
throughout with the use of an example. Their efficiency is investigated using a library 
of large example fault trees. 
 
2. Non-coherent fault trees 
 
Fault tree structures can be classified according to their underlying logic. If during 
fault tree construction the failure logic is restricted to the use of the AND gate and the 
OR gate, the resulting fault tree is called coherent. If NOT logic is used or directly 
implied (by for example the use of exclusive OR, XOR, gates) the resulting fault tree 
can be non-coherent.  
 
Define each component in the system according to an indicator xi to show its status: 
®¯­ 
working.iscomponentif0
failed,iscomponentif1
i
i
xi  (1) 
where ni ,...,2,1 , n is the number of components in the system. 
 
The fault tree diagram represents a logic structure which can be expressed by a 
structure function I :  
®¯­ 
working.issystemif0
failed,issystemif1I  (2) 
I =I (x), where x = (x1, x2«xn).  
 
According to the requirements of coherency [5], a structure function I (x) is coherent 
if:  
x Each component i must be relevant, i.e. 
iii z xxx somefor),0(),1( II . (3) 
x I (x) is increasing (non-decreasing) for each xi , i.e. 
iii t ),0(),1( xx II . (4) 
where 
),,,1,,,(),1( 111 niii xxxx   II x , (5) 
).,,,0,,,(),0( 111 niii xxxx   II x  (6) 
 
The second of these conditions means that as the component deteriorates (x fails, so xi 
= 1) the system condition either does not change or also deteriorates. If the system is 
non-coherent for component i then for some state of the remaining components the 
system is failed then component i works and then when i fails the system is restored to 
the functioning (non-failed) condition. For example, system failure might occur due to 
the recovery of a failed component. Alternatively, during system failure, the failure of 
an additional component may bring the system to a good state. The fault tree is 
coherent if the NOT logic can be eliminated from the fault tree. 
  
Consider an example of the leak detection system shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Leak protection system 
 
A very high pressure gas is flowing as part of a gas transport system. If a leak (L) 
occurs on the section after the isolation valve (VAL), a gas detection system closes the 
valve. This stops a build up of the gas concentration in a location where an ignition 
source (I1) is possible. If the valve works and isolation occurs the high pressure gas 
can cause a rupture of the pipe and a second leak prior to the isolation valve. There is 
a permanent ignition source (I2) in this area, therefore, the problem can be avoided by 
a pressure relief valve (PRV) diverting the gas flow.  
 
An explosion can occur in two ways: 
x Gas is released prior to isolation valve, when the leak is detected, the isolation 
valve works but the pressure relief valve fails.  
x Gas is released after isolation valve, when the leak is detected, the isolation 
valve fails and the ignition source occurs. 
 
A fault tree representing causes of an ignition following a gas release is shown in 
Figure 2.   
I2 
I1 
L 
VAL 
PRV 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Explosion fault tree 
 
Working in a bottom-up way the following logic expression is obtained.  
1IVALLPRVVALLTop  , 
ZKHUH³´LV25³ā´LV$1' 
Therefore, ^ `PRVVALL ,,  and ^ 1`,, IVALL  are prime implicants, as combinations of 
component conditions (working or failed) which are necessary and sufficient to cause 
system failure. 
 
Also, unlike the reduction of the logic expression for a coherent fault tree the logic 
Equation for the top event in the non-coherent case does not produce a complete list 
of all prime implicants. In this example, there is one more failure mode: 
}1,,{ IPRVL , 
i.e. if a leak occurs and the pressure relief valve has failed and an ignition source is 
present on the section after the isolation valve it does not matter if the isolation valve 
closes or not, an ignition of the gas release will occur. 
 
Therefore, the full logic expression for the Top event is: 
11 IPRVLIVALLPRVVALLTop  , 
which can be obtained by applying the consensus law: 
YXYAXAYAXA   . 
There are usually considerably more prime implicant sets than there are minimal cut 
sets for a coherent representation. Also the prime implicant sets tend to be a larger 
order (number of elements in a set) than the minimal cut sets. The increase in length 
of the logic Equation can cause difficulties for large fault trees. A coherent 
approximation can be obtained by assuming that all working states are TRUE, i.e. the 
probability of a component working is very close to 1. In the example shown in 
Figure 2 there are two minimal cut sets, ^ `PRVL,  and ^ 1`,, IVALL : 
Ignition following 
gas release 
Top 
Gas release prior to 
VAL and ignition 
G1 
Gas release after 
VAL and ignition 
G2 
L VAL
 
PRV VAL L I1 
.1
11
11
IVALLPRVL
IPRVLIVALLPRVL
IPRVLIVALLPRVVALLTop
 
|
 
 
 
3. Conversion to BDDs 
 
Binary Decision Diagrams can be used for the accurate quantification of fault trees. 
They do not need to evaluate the prime implicant sets as an intermediate step and do 
not need approximations. These advantages are critical when analysing non-coherent 
fault trees and overcome the difficulties encountered with conventional fault tree 
theory. To utilise the method, the fault tree is converted to a binary decision diagram, 
representing the structure function SFBDD. 
 
Before the fault tree is converted to a BDD, the fault tree is manipulated so that the 
127ORJLFLV³SXVKHG´GRZQWKHIDXOWWUHHXQWLOLWLVDSSOLHGWREDVLFHYHQWVE\XVLQJ
'H0RUJDQ¶VODZVLH 
BABA   , (7) 
BABA   . (8) 
Each vertex in a SFBDD has an ite (if-then-else) structure. To illustrate this consider 
the ite structure ite(x, f1, f0), which means that if x fails then consider function f1, else 
consider function f0. Also, f1 lies on the 1 branch of x and f0 lies on the 0 branch.  
 
Constructing the SFBDD from a fault tree initially requires the basic events in the 
fault tree to be given an ordering. SFBDD construction then moves through the fault 
tree in a bottom-up manner.  
x Each basic event is assigned an ite structure 
a = ite(a,1,0). (9) 
x Alternatively, a basic event a  is assigned an ite structure: 
a = ite(a,0,1). (10) 
x Dealing with gate inputs: 
If J = ite(x,f1, f0) and H = ite(y,g1, g0) represent two inputs to a gate of logic type  
then ®¯­  
 
ordering.theinif),,(
ordering,theinif),,(
0011
01
yxgfgfx
yxHfHfx
HJ
ite
ite
 (11) 
For small examples the variable ordering is largely irrelevant. Variable ordering 
schemes are discussed in [12,13]. Consider the variable ordering scheme L < VAL < 
PRV < I1. Applying the conversion rules (9)-(11) to the fault tree in Figure 2 results 
in a SFBDD presented in Figure 3. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. SFBDD for the fault tree in Figure 2 
 
4. Calculation of prime implicant sets 
 
In addition to quantification of the top event, knowledge of prime implicant sets can 
be valuable in gaining an understanding of the system. It can help to develop a repair 
schedule for failed components if a system cannot be taken off line for repair. The 
SFBDD which encodes the structure function cannot be used directly to produce the 
complete list of prime implicant sets of a non-coherent fault tree. 
 
For example, consider a general component x in a non-coherent system. In a prime 
implicant a component x can appear in a failed or working state, or can be excluded 
from the failure mode. In the first two situations x is said to be relevant, in the third 
case it is irrelevant to the system state. Component x can be either failure relevant (the 
prime implicant set contains x) or repair relevant (the prime implicant set contains x ). 
A general node in the SFBDD, which represents component x, has two branches. The 
1 branch corresponds to the failure of x; therefore, x is either failure relevant or 
irrelevant. Similarly, the 0 branch corresponds to the functioning of x and so x is 
either repair relevant or irrelevant. Hence it is impossible to distinguish between the 
two cases for each branch and the prime implicant sets cannot be identified directly 
from the BDD. 
 
4.1. Ternary Decision Diagram method 
 
A method to use a ternary decision diagram (TDD) in order to compute the prime 
implicant sets of a non-coherent fault tree structure is proposed in this section. It 
employs the consensus theorem and creates, in addition to the two branches of the 
BDD, a third branch for every node, called the consensus branch. This third branch  
HQFRGHVWKH³KLGGHQ´SULPHLPSOLFDQWVHWV7KHPLQLPLVDWLRQDOJRULWKP>@LVDSSOLHG
to remove non-minimal paths. 
 
4.1.1. Conversion of fault trees to TDDs 
 
The TDD representation features a node structure with three exit branches. A new ifre 
structure is presented which distinguishes not only between relevant and irrelevant 
components but also it distinguishes between the type of relevancy, i.e. failure 
relevant and repair relevant. The ifre structure for a node x is given in Figure 4. So if: 
1 
L 
0 
0 
1 
VAL 
0 
1 
1 0 
I1 
0 
PRV 
1 
1 0 
0 
F1 
F2 
F3 F4 
I = ifre(x, f1, f0, f2), (12) 
then 
I = x f1+ x f0 + f2, (13) 
where 
 f2 = f1ǜf0. (14) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. ifre structure 
 
The 1 branch encodes prime implicant sets for which component x is failure relevant, 
the 0 branch encodes prime implicant sets for which component x is repair relevant, 
DQGWKH³&´EUDQFKHQFRGHVSULPHLPSOLFDQWVHWVIRUZKLFKFRPSRQHQWx is irrelevant. 
The ifre structure shown in Figure 4 can be interpreted as follows: 
 
If x is failure relevant 
 then consider f1, 
 else x is repair relevant  
 then consider f0 
 else consider f2 
endif  
 
Function f2 represents prime implicant sets for which x is irrelevant, i.e. neither failure 
QRUUHSDLUUHOHYDQWFRPELQDWLRQV7KH³&´EUDQFKLVQRWobtained for all components. 
7KHUHIRUH WKLVEUDQFK FDQEHNHSW ³HPSW\´ IRU FRPSRQHQWV WKDW DUHRQO\ IDLOXUHRU
repair relevant but not both. If the conjunction of the two branches f1ǜf0 is not required, 
f2 = NIL. Symbol NIL identifies FDVHVZKHQ WKH ³&´EUDQFK LV QRW UHTXLUHGDQG no 
Boolean operations that involve this branch are needed. When operating the new 
symbol in the Boolean algebra, it is defined that NILA= NIL. 
 
The conversion process for computing the TDD from the non-coherent fault tree is an 
extension to the method used to develop the conventional BDD. Basic events of the 
fault tree must be ordered. Then the following process is presented: 
x %\ WKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI'H0RUJDQ¶V ODZVSXVKDQ\127JDWHVGRZQ WKURXJK
the fault tree until it reaches a basic event level. 
x Each basic event is assigned an ifre structure.  
If a is only failure or repair relevant: 
a
 
= ifre(a,1,0,NIL), (15) 
 
x 
f1 f2 f0 
1 
  
C 0 
a  = ifre(a,0,1,NIL). (16) 
  
If a is failure and repair relevant: 
a
 
= ifre(a,1,0,0), (17) 
a  = ifre(a,0,1,0). (18) 
x Traversing the fault tree in a bottom-up manner and considering gates whose 
inputs have been expressed in an ifre format gives: 
If J
 
= ifre(x, f1, f0, f2) and H = ifre(y, g1, g0, g2), then 
®¯­ 
  ),,,(
),,,(
0101
0101
LLLLx
KKKKx
HJ
ifre
ifre
 
ordering.theinif
ordering,theinif
yx
yx
 

 
(19) 
here HfK  11 , HfK  00 , 111 gfL  , 000 gfL  , K1·  K0 ± consensus of 
K1 and K0, L1·  L0 ± consensus of L1 and L0. 
 
If component x is failure or repair relevant, K1·  K0 = NIL, L1·  L0 = NIL in Equation 
19. 
 
Within each ifre calculation an additional consensus calculation is performed to 
HQVXUHDOOWKH³KLGGHQ´SULPHLPSOLFDQWVHWVDUHHQFRGHGLQWKH7'',WFDOFXODWHVWKH
product of the 1 and the 0 branch of every node and thus identifies the consensus of 
each node. 
 
Consider the fault tree in Figure 2. Introducing the ordering of basic events L < VAL 
< PRV < I1 and applying the rules described in Equations (15)-(19) gives the TDD in 
Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. The TDD for the fault tree shown in Figure 2 
 
It can be seen that the TDD in Figure 5 is different from the SFBDD in Figure 3 only 
ZLWKLWV³&´EUDQFKWKDWUHSUHVHQWVWKHLQWHUVHFWLRQRIWKHDQGEUDQFKHV2QO\IRU
node F2 a new structure F5 is created. 7KHRWKHUQRGHVKDYHWKH³&´EUDQFKOHDGLQJ
to value NIL, since they encode variables that only appear as failure or repair relevant 
To obtain prime implicant sets non-minimal combinations from every path need to be 
removed.   
1 
L 
1 
VAL 
0 C 
F1 
F2 0 
0 C 
NIL 
1 
1 
I1 F3 
0 
0 C 
NIL 
PRV 
1 
1 
F4 
0 
0 C 
NIL 
1 
PRV 
1 
1 
I1 
F5 
F6 0 
0 C 
NIL 
0 
0 C 
NIL 
 4.1.2. Minimisation of TDDs 
 
Once the TDD has been computed there is no guarantee that the resulting structure 
will be minimal, i.e. produce the prime implicant sets exactly. In order to perform the 
qualitative analysis a minimisation procedure needs to be implemented.  
 
The algorithm developed by Rauzy for minimising the BDD [1] can be extended to 
create a minimal consensus TDD that encodes only the prime implicant sets.  
 
Consider a general node in the TDD which is represented by the function F, where  
F = ifre(x, G, H, K). (20) 
Since there are three types of variables in the TDD (failure relevant, repair relevant 
and both), the minimisation process is described for these three cases.  
 
Minimal solutions of G, H and K are denoted as Gmin, Hmin and Kmin. Let į be a 
minimal solution of G, which is not a minimal solution of K. Then the intersection of 
įDQGx ( xG ) will be a minimal solution of F6LPLODUO\OHWȖEHDPLQLPDOVROXWLRQ
of H, which is not a minimal solution of K, and the inteUVHFWLRQRIȖDQG x  ( xJ ) 
will be a minimal solution of F. 
 
Case 1 - x is failure relevant only 
 
In Equation (20) K = NIL and the calculation of prime implicant sets is equivalent to 
WKH%''FDVHZKHUHWKH³&´EUDQch does not exist, i.e.  
solmin(F) = min)( Hx G . (21) 
The set solmin(F) represents the minimal solutions of F by removing any minimal 
solutions of G that are also minimal solutions of H. 
 
Case 2 - x is repair relevant only 
 
Again, in Equation (20) K = NIL and the calculation of prime implicant sets is defined 
as: 
solmin(F) = min)( Gx J . (22) 
The set solmin(F) represents the minimal solutions of F by removing any minimal 
solutions of H that are also minimal solutions of G. 
 
Case 3 - x is failure and repair relevant 
 
The set of all the minimal solutions of F is given as: 
solmin(F) = min)()( Kxx  JG . (23) 
The set solmin(F) represents the minimal solutions of F by removing any minimal 
solutions of G and H that are also minimal solutions of K. 
 
4.1.3. Obtaining prime implicant sets from TDDs 
 
The identification of prime implicant sets depends on the relevance of the node in the 
three cases, as it was given in the section above.  
 Case 1 
  
Traversing the 1 branch of node x results in a failed state of a component in a 
particular failure mode. Traversing the 0 branch of node x does not include that 
component in a particular failure mode.  
 
Case 2 
 
Traversing the 0 branch of node x results in a repaired state of a component in a 
particular failure mode. Traversing the 1 branch of node x does not include that 
component in a particular failure mode. 
 
Case 3 
 
Traversing the 1 branch of node x results in a failed state of a component in a 
particular failure mode. Traversing the 0 branch of node x results in a working state of 
DFRPSRQHQWLQDSDUWLFXODUIDLOXUHPRGH)LQDOO\WUDYHUVLQJWKH³&´EUDQFKRIQRGHx 
does not include that component in a particular failure mode at all 
 
Traversing the TDD in Figure 5 from the root vertex to terminal vertices 1 gives three 
prime implicant sets.  
F1-F2-F3 {L, VAL, I1} 
F1-F2-F4 },,{ PRVVALL  
F1-F2-F5-F6 {L, PRV, I1} 
 
The TDD method provides a good alternative technique for performing the qualitative 
analysis for non-coherent fault trees. 
 
4.2. Established methods 
 
This section presents the existing methods for converting non-coherent fault trees to 
BDDs and obtaining prime implicant sets. In the later section the efficiency of all 
methods, including the TDD method, will be investigated and compared using some 
example fault trees.  
 
4.2.1. Meta-products BDD method 
 
This method converts a SFBDD to a meta-products BDD which produces all prime 
implicant sets. A meta-products BDD obtained is in its minimal form. 
 
4.2.1.1.Conversion of SFBDDs to meta-products BDDs 
 
An alternative notation was developed in [6,7] that associates two variables with 
every component x. The first variable, Px, denotes relevancy and the second variable, 
Sx, denotes the type of relevancy, i.e. failure or repair relevant. A meta-product, 
MP(ʌ), is the intersection of all the system components according to their relevancy to 
WKH V\VWHP VWDWH DQG ʌ UHSUHVHQWV WKH SULPH LPSOLFDQW VHW HQFRGHG LQ PHWD-product 
MP(ʌ). 
°¯
°®
­
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
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 (24) 
The proposed algorithm by Dutuit and Rauzy [7] is used for calculating the meta-
products BDD of a fault tree from the BDD. The meta-products BDD is always 
minimal, therefore it encodes the prime implicant sets exactly.  
 
In order to present the algorithm, consider node F in a SFBDD, where F = ite(x, F1, 
F0). The meta-products BDD, that describes prime implicant sets using Equation (24), 
is expressed as: 
PI(F) = ite(Px, ite(Sx, P1, P0), P2), (25) 
where  
P2 = PI(F1·F0), (26) 
P1 = PI(F1) · 2P , (27) 
P0 = PI(F0) · 2P . (28) 
x is the first element in the variable ordering, PI(F) represents the structure of a meta-
products BDD, PI is used to denote the prime implicants.  
 
P2 encodes the prime implicants for which x is irrelevant, P1 encodes the prime 
implicants for which x is failure relevant and P0 encodes the prime implicants for 
which x is repair relevant. 
 
If not all the basic events in the variable ordering appear on the particular path, then 
PI(F) = ite(
jx
P , 0, PI(F)).  (29) 
here xj is before xi  and xj does not appear on the current path from the root node to 
node F. 
 
If F is a terminal node, then 
PI(0) = 0, (30) 
PI(1) = ite(
ix
P , 0, ite(
1ix
P «ite(
nx
P , 0, 1))).  (31) 
where xi « xn are basic events from the variable ordering that have not yet been 
considered in the process. 
 
Each node in Figure 3 is considered in turn. Applying Equations (25)-(28) to node F1 
gives: 
PI(F1) = ite(PL, ite(SL, PI(F2) · 1, PI(0) · 1), PI(F2 · 0)) = ite(PL, ite(SL, PI(F2), 0), 0). 
 
Now consider node F2. Applying Equation (25) to node F2 gives: 
PI(F2) = ite(PVAL, ite(SVAL, PI(F3)·  43 · FFPI , PI(F4)·  43 · FFPI ), PI(F3 · F4)). 
 
First of all, PI(F3 · F4) is calculated using Equations (25)-(28): 
PI(F3 · F4) = ite(PPRV, ite(SPRV, ite(PI1, ite(SI1, 1, 0), 0), 0), 0). 
 Applying Equations (29)-(31) gives the two following expressions: 
PI(F3) = ite(PPRV, 0, ite(PI1, ite(SI1, 1, 0), 0)), 
PI(F4) = ite(PPRV, ite(SPRV, ite(PI1, 0, 1), 0), 0). 
 
Negation  43 · FFPI  is calculated swapping terminal vertices 1 and 0.  
 43 · FFPI = ite(PPRV, ite(SPRV, ite(PI1, ite(SI1, 0, 1), 1), 1), 1). 
 
Since there are no repeated parts between PI(F3) and  43 · FFPI ,  
PI(F3)·  43 · FFPI  = PI(F3). 
 
The same simplification is applied to PI(F4) and  43 · FFPI ,  
PI(F4)·  43 · FFPI  = PI(F4). 
The resulting meta-products BDD for the BDD in Figure 3 is shown in Figure 6. 
 
4.2.1.2.Obtaining prime implicant sets 
 
Now it is possible to obtain the meta-products and identify the prime implicant sets. 
Every path from the root node to a terminal 1 gives a prime implicant set. 
 
  11 IIPRVVALVALLL SPPSPSP  {L, VAL, I1} 
  1IPRVPRVVALVALLL PSPSPSP  },,{ PRVVALL  
  11 IIPRVPRVVALLL SPSPPSP  {L, PRV, I1} 
 
For example, in the first meta-product PL signifies that component L is relevant and SL 
signifies that component L is failure relevant. The same with components VAL and I1. 
PRVP  means that component PRV is irrelevant. Hence the prime implicant set 
obtained is {L, VAL, I1}. 
 
The number of nodes in a meta-products BDD increases largely since every basic 
event x is presented by two nodes, Px and Sx. The process can be time-consuming. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Meta-products BDD for calculating prime implicant sets 
 
4.2.2. ZBDD method 
 
An alternative method presented by Rauzy in [9] uses the idea of zero-suppressed 
BDDs (ZBDD) introduced by Minato in [10]. The method requires to label nodes with 
failed and/or working states of basic events and to decompose prime implicant sets 
according to the presence of a given state of a basic event. 
 
4.2.2.1.Zero-Suppressed BDDs 
 
Zero-suppressed BDDs are BDDs based on a reduction rule. This data structure 
provides a unique and compact representation which is more efficient and simpler 
than the usual BDDs when manipulating sets in combinatorial problems. The 
following reduction rules for BDDs are applied: 
x Eliminate all the nodes that have the 1 branch pointing to terminal vertex 0. 
Then connect the branch that was pointing to the eliminated node to the BDD 
structure beneath the 0 branch of the eliminated node as shown in Figure 7. 
x Share all equivalent BDD structures as for original BDDs. 
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Figure 7. Elimination process 
 
ZBDDs automatically suppress basic events that do not appear in prime implicant 
sets. It is very efficient when calculating sets with basic events that are far apart in the 
variable ordering scheme. For example, in Figure 7 the left-hand BDD contains a 
prime implicant set {a, e}. The established variable ordering is a<b<c<d<e. The 
ZBDD obtained by applying the reduction rules brings basic events close since the 
intermediate nodes (F2, F3, F4) can be eliminated.  
 
4.2.2.2.Decomposition rule 
 
The principle of this algorithm is to traverse the SFBDD that encodes structure 
function I = ite(x, f1, f0) in a depth-first way and to build a ZBDD that encodes the 
prime implicant sets of I  in a bottom-up way.  
 
The rule is divided in four cases: 
 
Case 1: if basic event x appears in its failed and working states then  
PI(I ) = 201 SSxxS  , (32) 
where  
S2 = PI( f1Âf0 ),  (33) 
S1 = PI( f1 ) \ S2, (34) 
S0 = PI( f0 ) \ S2. (35) 
+HUH³\´LVRperator without [1] that is used minimising conventional BDDs.  
 
Case 2: if basic event x appears in its failed state only then 
PI(I ) = 01 SxS  , (36) 
where  
S0 = PI( f0 ), (37) 
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S1 = PI( f1 ) \ S0. (38) 
 
Case 3: if basic event x appears in its working state only then it is considered in a 
similar way to case 2. 
 
Case 4: if basic event x does not appear in the system then  
PI(I ) = PI( f1 + f0 ). (39) 
 
The resulting ZBDDs retain the variable ordering from the SFBDD. In addition, 
working states of basic events that appear in both states are incorporated in the 
ordering scheme, i.e. they appear after the basic event in its failed state in the ordering 
scheme. 
 
4.2.2.3.ZBDD Example 
 
Consider the SFBDD in Figure 3. Introduce the variable ordering for the ZBDD 
method L < VAL < VAL < PVR < I1. Applying the rules described in Equations (32)-
(39) gives the ZBDD in Figure 8.  
 
Each node is considered in the bottom-up way. 
F3 = ite(I1, 1, 0), PI(F3) = ite(I1, 1, 0) - Both vertices are terminal. 
F4 = ite(PRV, 1, 0), PI(F4) = ite(PRV, 1, 0) - Both vertices are terminal.  
 
F2 = ite(VAL, F3, F4), PI(F2) = ite(VAL, S1, ite(VAL , S0, S2)) - Basic event VAL 
appears in both failed and working states.  
Here, following Equations (33)-(35) gives:  
S2 = PI( FÂF3 ) = PI(ite(PRV, ite(I1, 1, 0), 0)) = ite(PRV, ite(I1, 1, 0), 0) - Both basic 
events PRV and I1 appear only in their failed state. 
S1 = PI(F3) \ S2 = ite(I1, 1, 0) - There are no repeated paths in F3 that are covered by 
S2. 
S0 = PI(F4) \ S2 = ite(PRV, 1, 0) - There are no repeated paths in F4 that are covered 
by S2. 
 
Therefore,  
PI(F2) = ite(VAL, ite(I1, 1, 0), ite(VAL ,ite(PRV, 1, 0), ite(PRV, ite(I1, 1, 0), 0))). 
 
According to Equation (36)  
F1 = ite(L, F2, 0), PI(F1) = ite(L, PI(F2), 0) - Basic event L appears only in its failed 
state.  
 
After the last substitution we obtain: 
PI(F1) = ite(L, ite(VAL, ite(I1, 1, 0), ite(VAL , ite(PRV, 1, 0),  
ite(PRV, ite(I1, 1, 0), 0))), 0). 
 
The ZBDD in Figure 8 is different form the SFBDD in Figure 3 because it has an 
additional variable VAL  that indicates prime implicant sets that contain VAL .  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The ZBDD for the SFBDD in Figure 3 
 
Every path from the root vertex to terminal vertex 1 presents a prime implicant set. 
Therefore, this ZBDD contains three prime implicant sets:  
 
F1-F2-F3 {L, VAL, I1} 
F1-F2-F4-F5 },,{ PRVVALL  
F1-F2-F4-F6-F7 {L, PRV, I1} 
 
The ZBDD is an efficient technique where all prime implicant sets are described by a 
compact and easy handling structure.  
 
4.2.3. Labelled variable method 
 
The labelled variable method [11] provides another alternative method for 
constructing BDDs for non-coherent fault trees. BDDs constructed using this  
conversion approach consist of variables that are labelled according to their type. 
They are called labelled binary decision diagrams (L-BDDs).  
 
The background for this method is that the current analysis algorithms consider the 
fault tree structure as a Boolean function in which all variables have the same 
properties, whereas the operations to be applied to determine the prime implicant sets 
DUH GHSHQGHQW RQ WKH YDULDEOHV¶ W\SH )RU H[DPSOH YDULDEOHV WKDW DSSHDU LQ WKHLU
failure and success states can appear in combinations of events which lead to system 
failure in both states, and which are not covered by the SFBDD obtained. In the L-
BDD method it is convenient to consider this additional information about the type of 
a variable during the conversion process itself. The aim of the L-BDD method is to 
construct and analyse a L-BDD in which all variables are labelled with their type. 
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 4.2.3.1.Conversion of fault trees to L-BDDs 
 
The structure function I (x) of a non-coherent fault tree may contain three different 
types of basic events. For example, the function cbcabax  )(I  contains a 
double form (DF) variable a that appears in both states, a single form positive (SFP) 
variable b and a single form negative (SFN) variable c. In the further presentation the 
SFP variable x will be simply presented by x, the SFN variable x will be labelled as 
³x´DQGWKH')YDULDEOHx ZLOOEHODEHOOHGDV³	x´ 
 
The conversion process for computing the L-BDD from the non-coherent fault tree is 
an extension to the method used to develop the SFBDD. Basic events of the fault tree 
must be ordered. Then the following process is performed: 
x %\ WKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI'H0RUJDQ¶V ODZVSXVKDQ\127JDWHVGRZQ WKURXJK
the fault tree until it reaches a basic event level. 
x Each basic event is assigned an ite structure as in Equation (9) or Equation 
(10). 
x Traversing the fault tree in a bottom-up manner and considering gates whose 
inputs have been expressed in an ite format using Equation (11). 
 
The last rule Equation (11) of this algorithm is extended presenting some additional 
rules that incorporate labelled variables.  
x Considering the ordering &x < x < $x implements the following Equations: 
If J = ite(x,f1, f0) and H = ite($x,g1, g0), 
 then ),,(& 1001 gfgfxHJ   ite  (40) 
If J = ite(&x,f1, f0) and H = ite(x,g1, g0),  
then ),,(& 0011 gfgfxHJ   ite  (41) 
If J = ite(&x,f1, f0) and H = ite($x,g1,g0), 
then ),,(& 1001 gfgfxHJ   ite  (42) 
Applying the conversion rules given in Equations (9)-(11) and Equations (40)-(42) to 
the fault tree in Figure 2 results in a L-BDD presented in Figure 9. The variable 
ordering is L < VAL < PRV < I1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. BDD with labelled variables for the fault tree in Figure 2 
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 The resulting L-%''LVHTXLYDOHQWWRLWV6)%''LQ)LJXUHLI')YDULDEOH³	VAL´
is replaced by variable VAL. The L-BDD does not provide all the information for the 
qualitative analysis, therefore some additional calculations are performed in order to 
get all prime implicant sets. 
 
4.2.3.2.Simplification of L-BDD 
 
The most complex rules of the qualitative analysis of the L-BDD are applied to nodes 
with DF variables. Therefore, it is convenient to reduce the number of DF variables 
before calculating prime implicant sets. The rules are applied on the parts of the L-
BDD that have a terminal vertex. Simplification rules are shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Simplification rules for the L-BDD 
 
The example L-BDD in Figure 9 is in its simplest form, therefore the simplification 
rules are not applied. 
 
4.2.3.3.Obtaining prime implicant sets from L-BDD 
 
Let structure function I  be: 
01 fxfx ii  I  (43) 
where the two residues are: 
),...,1,...,( 11 nxxf I  (44) 
),...,0,...,( 10 nxxf I  (45) 
Let PI(I ) be the prime implicants of I . Visiting the L-BDD in the bottom-up way 
the procedure to be applied to the node xi  to determine the prime implicants is as 
follows: 
x If xi KDVODEHO³	´WKHQ 
201 $)( SSxSxPI ii  I  (46) 
where  
&x 
1 G 
x 
1 G 
&x 
0 G 
$x 
0 G 
&x 
1 F 
$x 
1 F 
&x 
0 F 
x 
0 F 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
200211012 \,\, SfSSfSffS    . (47) 
x Else 
01)( fSPI  DI  (48) 
where  
011 \,$ ffSxorx ii   D  (49) 
³\´LVWKHRSHUDWRU³ZLWKRXW´SURSRVHGE\5DX]\>@6RPHH[WUDUXOHVDUHDSSOLHGLQ
the cases with labelled variables. 
 
For example, 01 \ ff  gives the L-BDD of f1 in which the combinations of f1 repeated 
in  f0 are removed.  
 
The heaviest operation is the intersection S2 = 01 ff   that, however, is applied only 
ZKHQGHDOLQJZLWK³	´W\SHYDULDEOHV,WFDOFXODWHVWKH³KLGGHQ´SULPHLPSOLFDQWVHWV
,IWKHUHDUHQR³	´W\SHYDULDbles, the L-BDD contains all prime implicant sets.  
 
The rules for writing the prime implicant sets from an L-BDD are straightforward. On 
the path from the root to any terminal node: 
x For variables x³x´GRQRWFRQVLGHUWKHQHJDWHGSDUW 
x )RUYDULDEOHV³	x´FRQVLGHUWKHULJKWEUDQFKDV x .  
 
Consider the L-BDD shown in Figure 9. Prime implicant sets can be calculated using 
Equations (46)-(49). 
 
Since the variable of node F2 is a DF variable, i.e. it appears in the fault tree in both 
success and failure states, the intersection of its 1 and 0 branches is calculated in order 
WRJHW DOO SULPH LPSOLFDQW VHWV7KLVSURFHVV LV VLPLODU WR WKHFDOFXODWLRQRI WKH ³&´
branch in the TDD method.  
 
 P  = F3 · F4 = ite(I1, 1 , 0) · ite(PRV, 1 , 0) = ite(PRV, ite(I1, 1 , 0), 0), 
 PI(P) = PRV · S1 + f0, here S1 = I1, f0 = 0, 
 PI(P) = PRV · I1. 
Since there are no repeated paths between the 1 branch and the structure P and none 
between the 0 branch and the structure P, prime implicant sets of F2 are as follows: 
 PI(F2) = VAL · I1 + VAL  ·  PRV + PRV · I1. 
Finally, the last node F1 is considered: 
 PI(F1) = L · S1 + f0, here S1 = PI(F2), f0 = 0, 
 PI(F1) = L · (VAL · I1 + VAL  ·  PRV + PRV · I1). 
The three prime implicant sets are obtained: 
{L, VAL, I1}, },,{ PRVVALL , {L, PRV, I1}. 
 
The L-BDD method provides an efficient technique that allows to calculate prime 
implicant sets using the prior information about the type of every variable. 
 
5. Quantitative analysis of non-coherent  
 
5.1.Quantification of a non-coherent system using the TDD 
 
In order to perform the quantitative analysis for non-coherent fault trees using the 
BDD method, a non-coherent fault tree is converted to a SFBDD that represents the 
structure function of the fault tree. In the TDD method the non-coherent fault tree is 
converted to the TDD that has three branches from each node. The third branch is 
created to encode all prime implicants of the system. However, the TDD can be used 
not only for the qualitative analysis but also for the quantitative analysis.  
 
Consider node F in the TDD, F = ifre(x, f1, f0, f1f0). The structure function )(xI  was 
expressed in (13), i.e. 0101)( fffxxf  xI . Using the pivotal decomposition to the 
structure function of order n it is possible to express it in terms of structure functions 
that are of order n-1. Pivoting )(xI  about variable x and applying the absorption law 
to Equation 35 gives:  
    01010011),0(),1()( fxxffffxfffxxx ii    xxx III . (50) 
Then the expectation of )(xI  is obtained and the top event probability is calculated: 
     )(1)( 01 fQqfQqEQ xxSYS   xI . (51) 
Therefore, the probability of the top event, QSYS, is the sum of the probabilities of the 
disjoint paths through the TDD. The disjoint paths, that are taken into account, can be 
found by tracing all paths from the root vertex via the 1 and 0 branches to terminal 1 
YHUWLFHV7KHGLVMRLQWSDWKVYLDWKH³&´EUDQFKDUHQRW LQFOXGHGLQWKHTXDQWLILFDWLRQ
process.  
 
If the quantitative analysis is required as well as the qualitative analysis, the TDD 
before the minimisation can be used for the quantification process. Additional 
calculations for obtaining the SFBDD are not required. 
 
5.2.Quantitative analysis using other methods  
 
Consider a node F in the SFBDD, F = ite(x, f1, f0). The structure function )(xI  is 
expressed as 01)( fxxf  xI , which is adequate to the expression in (50). Therefore, 
the probability of the top event, QSYS, is obtained as a sum of probabilities of the 
disjoint paths through the SFBDD. Quantitative analysis is performed in this way 
applying the meta-products BDD method and the ZBDD method, where the SFBDD 
is obtained after fault tree conversion prior to the qualitative analysis.  
 
In the L-BDD method the quantitative analysis is adequate, i.e. the probability of the 
top event, QSYS, is the sum of the probabilities of the disjoint paths through the L-
BDD. In this case each variable &x is treated as x, and $x ± as x . 
 
6. Comparison of the four methods 
 
The theoretical comparison of the four different techniques is provided in Table 1.  
 Method Minimisa
tion 
Construction 
technique 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Ternary 
Decision 
Diagram 
(TDD) 
Required Basic event x is 
coded by a node 
with three branches. 
The third branch is 
the conjunction of 
the 1 and the 0 
branches and the 
conjunction is 
performed if needed 
A clear 
representation 
of all implicant 
sets is 
provided. 
1.Minimisation is 
required 
2.TDD size is 3n. 
Meta-
products 
BDD 
Not 
required 
Basic event x is 
coded by two 
variables Px and Sx. 
No 
minimisation 
is required. 
1.Meta-products 
BDD size is 22n 
2.It results in a 
time consuming 
process. 
Zero-
suppres-
sed BDD 
(ZBDD) 
Not 
required 
Basic event x is 
coded by x and, in 
addition, by x , if 
needed. The 
conjunction of the 1 
and the 0 branches 
is performed only 
for dual state 
variables. 
1.No 
minimisation 
is required 
2.Compact 
representation 
of prime 
implicant sets 
is provided. 
Dual state events 
are coded by two 
variables 
Labelled 
BDD (L-
BDD) 
Required Basic event x is 
labelled according 
to its occurrence, 
(&x<x<$ x). The 
conjunction of the 1 
and the 0 branches 
is performed only 
for dual state 
variables. 
Labels identify 
where the 
conjunction of 
the 1 and the 0 
branches is 
required.  
1.Minimisation is 
required 
2.Labelling 
introduces some 
additional 
variables  
 
Table 1. Comparison of the four techniques 
 
Table 1 gives a short overview of all four construction techniques. It highlights the 
main advantages and disadvantages of the four approaches. The TDD method 
SURYLGHV D FOHDU DQG HIILFLHQW UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI SULPH LPSOLFDQW VHWV ZKHQ WKH ³&´
branch for a node is created if needed. Also, using the ZBDD a compact 
representation of prime implicant sets is obtained which does not require the 
minimisation process. The least favourable technique is the meta-products BDD 
method where two variables are assigned for every basic event. Due to this feature the 
size of the BDD and the processing time is increased unavoidably.  
 
The efficiency of the four methods for calculating prime implicant sets was  
investigated using a benchmark of medium sized fault trees from industry. The 
performance over 13 example fault trees was obtained, since each method may 
perform well on some fault trees dependent upon the fault tree structure. The 
complexity of the 13 fault trees is indicated in columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2, 
representing the number of gates, the number of events and the number of prime 
implicant sets in their solution.  
 
The number of nodes using the TDD method, the meta-products BDD method, the 
ZBDD method and the L-BDD method are presented in columns 5, 6, 7 and 8 
respectively. The number of nodes in the TDD method describes the sum of the 
number of nodes in the TDD before the minimisation and the number of nodes in the 
TDD after the minimisation. The number of nodes for the second method covers the 
number of nodes in the SFBDD and the meta-products BDD. For the ZBDD method 
the number of nodes in the SFBDD and the number of nodes in the ZBDD is given. 
The number of nodes in the L-BDD method contains the sum of the number of nodes 
in the L-BDD before applying the minimisation and the number of nodes in the 
minimised L-BDD. 
 
Similarly, the processing time in seconds covers the time taken to convert example 
fault trees to BDDs and perform the qualitative analysis. Results of processing time 
are shown in columns 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Table 2 for the four methods respectively.  
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1 31 88 41388 784 2207 580 2942 1.43 484.24 1.91 4.68 
2 29 63 7433 984 1366 427 1231 0.20 10530.99 0.24 34.94 
3 40 86 5447 560 2189 564 1704 0.18 526.2 0.22 21.85 
4 32 83 4979 412 1854 496 1874 0.17 50.78 0.25 1.03 
5 28 69 1186 1276 3356 869 2991 0.09 1590.85 0.10 26.10 
6 26 50 1001 581 2692 596 2223 0.07 140.54 0.06 9.02 
7 21 42 289 298 880 223 610 0.01 36.65 0.04 0.22 
8 32 47 155 324 1038 309 1000 0.14 67.98 0.20 0.68 
9 19 42 152 452 1309 493 732 0.04 158.84 0.05 0.48 
10 34 57 71 258 816 284 708 0.02 60.07 0.04 1.00 
11 25 43 43 737 877 293 913 0.04 784.89 0.05 0.74 
12 41 74 35 396 741 214 264 0.08 15.05 0.21 0.50 
13 36 49 24 412 613 283 685 0.14 474.99 0.20 0.53 
 
Table 2. Calculation results for example fault trees 
 
As it was expected from the theoretical comparison of the methods, the meta-products 
BDD algorithm produced a lot larger final BDDs than any other methods that were 
used for the calculation of prime implicant sets. Processing time was also greater. 
This was especially true for examples with a large number of prime implicant sets 
(example 2 and 5). In those situations the number of nodes and the processing time 
could be decreased using any other method instead of the conventional meta-products 
BDD method.  
 
The TDD method performed as well as the ZBDD method. Both methods were more 
efficient than the meta-products BDD method and the L-BDD method in terms of the 
number of nodes and the processing time. For all example fault trees the TDD method 
was faster than the ZBDD method. This is due to the efficient representation of prime 
implicant sets in the TDD method, when the third branch is created if needed. 
According to the number of nodes, for some examples the ZBDD method was better 
than the TDD method. This outcome is explained by a compact representation of 
prime implicant sets in the ZBDD method and no requirement of additional storage 
for a minimal BDD.  
 
The second worst result was obtained using the L-BDD method. The weaknesses of 
the L-BDD method are the introduction of the three different types of basic events and 
the requirement for minimisation before obtaining prime implicant sets. 
 
Overall, these results show that the TDD method is an efficient method to obtain 
prime implicant sets, when all prime implicant sets are obtained by performing the 
conjunction of the two branches of each node. Information about the failure and/or 
repair relevancy of the component is used to identify if the conjunction of the two 
branches is needed, which makes the process efficient. Finally, the same TDD that is 
used to represent prime implicant sets before the minimisation can be used for the 
quantitative analysis, no additional structure is required.  
 
7. Discussion of Real-time BDD Analysis  
 
Recent research into autonomous vehicles (such as UAVs) is using BDDs to calculate 
the probability of mission failure at the current point in time. At a point in time certain 
phases may be known to have completed successfully (i.e. NOT failed, therefore 
requiring a non-coherent analysis), component failures may exist (as indicated by a 
fault detection and identification tool) or other events may have occurred. By 
establishing the potential causes of mission failure (prime implicant sets) and the 
updated likelihood decisions are made regarding the future operation of the 
autonomous vehicle.  
 
The fault tree to BDD conversion in this application is done off-line and so 
conversion time is important but not critical. Storing and processing the BDD on-
board of the vehicle are the factors which are the more critical in determining which is 
the best method to use.  
 
Since the Ternary Decision Diagram permits one representation for both qualitative 
and quantitative analyses and has a very good efficiency compared to the alternatives 
this representation is advantageous in this particular circumstance.  
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This paper presents procedures by which non-coherent fault trees can be examined 
and prime implicant sets obtained. Since the introduction of NOT logic to the logic 
function expands the calculation time and increases the size of the problem, the BDD 
method can be used as an alternative way for qualitative and quantitative analyses of 
non-coherent fault trees. This paper proposes a new alternative technique that 
produces a ternary decision diagram, which allows to calculate all prime implicants 
directly. Established methods - the conventional algorithm that produces a meta-
products BDD, the zero-suppressed BDD method and the labelled BDD method are 
presented and their efficiency is compared using some example fault trees. Efficiency 
analysis indicates that the new proposed TDD method is the fastest method and it 
provides an efficient representation of prime implicant sets. Another advantage of the 
TDD method is that it is suitable for both qualitative and quantitative analyses of non-
coherent fault trees, whereas in the existing techniques two separate BDDs need to be 
constructed if the full analysis is required.  
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